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JURISDICTION 
Plaintiffs and appellants (hereafter collectively referred to as the "Dimicks") 
appeal a final order of the Seventh District Court, Carbon County, State of Utah, granting 
defendant and appellee OHC Liquidation Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment.1 The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(4) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE #1: Did the trial court correctly determine that there were no genuine 
issues as to any material fact and that Oakwood was entitled to judgment in its favor as a 
matter of law where the Dimicks failed to raise a dispute as to any material fact and 
offered only the bare allegation of a defect in the Oakwood home and no evidence that 
their alleged injuries were proximately caused by a defect in the home? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In considering a trial court's grant of summary 
judgment, this Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. Bums v. 
Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994). This issue was 
preserved in the trial court. (R. 291, 302, 380, 455-456). 
ISSUE #2: Did the Dimicks' failure to object to the trial court's consideration of 
JThe OHC Liquidation Trust (hereafter "Oakwood") is the successor in interest to 
Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., a former North Carolina corporation, Oakwood Shared 
Services, LLC, a former Delaware corporation; and HBOS Manufacturing, LP (f/k/a 
Homes By Oakwood, Inc.)(f/k/a Schult Homes Corporation). 
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the "HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" and failure to argue to the trial court 
that the home violated government standards thereby preclude appellate review of these 
arguments? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court will not consider arguments raised for 
the first time on appeal. Coombs v. Juice Works Development, Inc., 2003 UT App 388 fn 
3; 81 P.3d 769. In the proceedings below, the Dimicks did not object to the trial court's 
consideration of the "HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" and did not argue 
that the home failed to comply with applicable government standards. The trial court did 
not consider or rule upon these issues, the issues were not preserved for appeal, and there 
is no decision for this Court to review. 
ISSUE #3: Did the trial court properly treat Oakwood's motion for summary 
judgment as a motion for judgment on all of the Dimicks' claims, rather than a motion for 
partial summary judgment, where Oakwood's motion specifically requested judgment in 
its favor as to all claims asserted by the Dimicks and the Dimicks had a full and fair 
opportunity to oppose the motion? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In considering a trial court's grant of summary 
judgment, this Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. Burns v. 
Cannondale Bicycle Co.. 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994). This issue was 
preserved in the trial court. (R. 291, 302, 380, 455-456). 
ISSUE #4: Did the trial court correctly certify as final the judgment in favor of 
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Oakwood where the judgment completely disposed of Oakwood as a party, the judgment 
would have been immediately appealable but for the existence of other parties in the 
action, and the trial court determined that there was no just cause for delay? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The question of whether an order is eligible for 
certification under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) is a question of law that an appellate court 
reviews for correctness. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 814 P.2d 1099, 
1100 (Utah 1991). This issue was preserved in the trial court. (R. 609). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, 
AND REGULATIONS 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6: 
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property 
damage allegedly caused by a defect in a product: 
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a 
defective condition, unless at the time the product was sold by 
the manufacturer or other initial seller, there was a defect or 
defective condition in the product which made the product 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. 
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the 
product was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or 
user of that product in that community considering the 
product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses 
together with any actual knowledge, training, or experience 
possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer. 
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from 
any defect or defective condition where the alleged defect in 
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the plans or designs for the product or the methods and 
techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the 
product were in conformity with government standards 
established for that industry which were in existence at the 
time the plans or designs for the product or the methods and 
techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the 
product were adopted. 
RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56: 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, 
may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, 
memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54: 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple 
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or 
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final 
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only 
upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the 
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of 
decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or 
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the 
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
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adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: The Dimicks assert claims for wrongful death and 
personal injury against Oakwood and various other parties. The claims arise out of the 
death of Cathleen Dimick ("Cathleen") and personal injuries sustained by Christopher 
Dimick ("Christopher") after both were infected with hantavirus. The Dimicks claim that 
on March 11, 2000, Cathleen and Christopher were simultaneously exposed to hantavirus 
while touring an Oakwood manufactured home at the Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, 
Utah. 
Happy Homes ordered this particular Oakwood home from Oakwood in May 1998. 
Oakwood then manufactured and delivered the home to Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, 
Utah in June 1998. Happy Homes then tendered payment for the home to Oakwood. 
When Christopher and Cathleen toured the home at the sales lot in March 2000, the home 
had been sitting on the lot (essentially an open field) for nearly two years. In those two 
years, the owners and operators of the sales lot showed the home to prospective 
purchasers countless times. 
Christopher contracted to purchase the home the same day he toured it. Happy 
Homes subsequently delivered the home to Christopher's property in Price, Utah in May 
2000. 
The Dimicks assert that on May 27, 2000, Cathleen fell ill with hantavirus and 
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died three days later. They further assert that on May 30, 2000, Christopher also fell ill 
with hantavirus and as a result sustained permanent injuries. 
Two years later, on April 11, 2002, the Dimicks filed suit against Oakwood, as 
well as the owners and operators of the home sales lot. The Dimicks subsequently 
amended their complaint three times, filing with the trial court a First Amended 
Complaint, Second Amended Complaint, and a Third Amended Complaint. However, the 
Dimicks only served copies of the First and Second Amended Complaints to the 
defendant parties, including Oakwood. The Dimicks' Second Amended Complaint 
asserted the following causes of action against all defendants: strict products liability; 
breach of implied warranty (fitness); breach of warranty (merchantability); breach of 
express warranty; negligent failure to warn; and premises liability. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: On October 14, 2004, over two years after the 
Dimicks filed suit, Oakwood filed a motion for summary judgment on all of the Dimicks' 
claims. After two years of discovery, during which the parties exchanged and answered 
written interrogatories, requests for admission, requests for production of documents, as 
and deposed several witnesses, the Dimicks produced no evidence to support their claims 
against Oakwood. Oakwood's motion argued that because there were no genuine 
disputes as to any material fact, and because Oakwood was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, the trial court should enter summary judgment in favor of Oakwood on all 
of the Dimicks' claims. In particular, Oakwood argued that the Dimicks failed to produce 
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any evidence of a defect in the home, no evidence the home was "unreasonably 
dangerous," and no evidence that a defect in the home proximately caused their injuries, 
and therefore, under Utah law, the Dimicks could not sustain their claims against 
Oakwood. 
The Dimicks opposed Oakwood's motion. They argued that they had produced 
evidence of a defect in the Oakwood home sufficient to defeat Oakwood's motion, and 
they further asserted that Oakwood's motion should be treated as a motion for partial 
summary judgment on only the Dimicks' strict products liability theory. 
In reply, Oakwood pointed out that the Dimicks had failed to create a dispute as to 
any material fact. Oakwood also argued that the Dimicks had failed to present any 
evidence of a defect in the Oakwood home. Furthermore, the Dimicks did not rebut the 
statutory presumption that the home was free of defects by virtue of its compliance with 
government standards. Finally, the Dimicks failed to offer any evidence that a defect in 
the home proximately caused their alleged injuries. Because the Dimicks failed to meet 
their evidentiary burden under Utah law, Oakwood argued that all of the Dimicks claims 
against Oakwood failed as a matter of law. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT: On February 28, 2005, the Seventh 
District Court, the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday presiding, heard oral argument on 
Oakwood's motion for summary judgment and took it under advisement. In a 
memorandum decision dated April 14, 2005, the trial court granted Oakwood's motion 
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and directed counsel for Oakwood to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Oakwood then prepared proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Utah R. 
Civ. P. 54(b) Certification of Final Judgment and served a copy to the Dimicks' counsel. 
The Dimicks filed an objection thereto. 
On July 29, 2005, the trial court signed Oakwood's proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and certified the judgment as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
On August 25, 2005, on its own accord, the trial court vacated the July 29, 2005 judgment 
in order to allow for oral argument of the Dimicks' objections to Oakwood's proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) Certification of Final 
Judgment. On September 23, 2005, the Seventh District Court, the Honorable Bruce K. 
Halliday presiding, heard oral argument on the Dimicks' objections. Following oral 
arguments, the trial court again entered Oakwood's Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) Certification of Final Judgment as 
submitted. The Dimicks appealed. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S FACTUAL STATEMENT 
The "Factual Statement" found on pages 8-11 of the Dimicks' Appellate Brief is 
taken nearly verbatim from their Memorandum in Opposition to the Oakwood 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 381-383). In the proceedings below, 
the Dimicks did not dispute the "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" in Oakwood's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, 
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as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). Instead, the Dimicks provided a separate 
statement of facts. Oakwood responded to the Dimicks' statement in its Reply 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and demonstrated that no 
factual disputes actually existed. Oakwood's responses to the Dimicks' statements are 
reproduced here to assist the Court in reviewing the Dimicks' "Factual Statement." (R. 
450-453). Oakwood also directs the Court's attention to Oakwood's "Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts" contained in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) Certification of Final Judgment. (R. 299-
301, 621).2 
1. Appellee-manufacturer, Oakwood Homes, owned the manufactured home 
at issue as it sat on the Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, Utah. The title to each 
manufactured home is held by a finance company until each home is sold to consumer(s). 
(Record on Appeal (hereinafter "R."), at 381, 390-391, 424-425). 
RESPONSE: This statement is not supported by evidence in the record. Happy 
Homes owned the home while it sat on their lot: it is undisputed that "after returning the 
final confirmation of its home order to [Oakwood], Happy Homes tendered payment to 
Schult for [the Dimick home]." (Record on Appeal (hereinafter "R.") 299, 314). 
2A copy of the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Utah R. Civ. 
P. 54(b) Certification of Final Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum #1. 
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Furthermore, the deposition testimony cited by the Dimicks does not support the 
statement. Neither Mary Musgrave nor Robert Hoggatt testified that the specific home 
purchased by Christopher Dimick from Happy Homes was owned by Oakwood while it 
sat on the Happy Homes lot. Ms. Musgrave's cited testimony speaks to general financing 
arrangements for manufactured homes rather than the specific financing of the Dimick 
Home, and Mr. Hoggatt only testified as to how Lifestyle Homes did business, not Happy 
Homes (the entity that actually sold the home to Christopher Dimick). (R. 390-391, 424-
425). 
2. When the home manufactured by Oakwood was delivered to the Happy 
Homes sales lot in Helper, Utah, it had 30-50 holes in the underside and exterior walls. 
The holes were at least large enough for a piece of conduit to fit through. (R. at 382-384, 
398-402). 
RESPONSE: The statement is incomplete. To support this statement, the 
Dimicks rely on deposition testimony of John Schram, the Happy Homes employee that 
set-up the home on Happy Homes sales lot. Mr. Schram testified that generally speaking 
there may have been 30 to 50 penetrations for piping, utility, and venting connections in 
the floor and walls of a manufactured home, however the penetrations were often caulked 
with foam and were not exposed to the elements. Specifically, Mr. Schram testified: 
Q: [By Mr. Booke] A little while ago you were talking about the 
penetrations that are sometimes put in the modular homes for 
plumbing and other reasons? 
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A: [By Mr. Schram] Uh-huh. 
Q: Did you caulk those holes as a part of patching up the holes or did 
you put caulk in the holes that were already there for plumbing or 
other reasons, electrical? 
A: The factory puts their plumbing and electrical through the holes and 
I'm not sure if they caulk or put like foam, the expanding foam. I 
think they do in some instances put the expanding foam around the 
pipes where they penetrate. 
Q: Did you? 
A: No, I didn't. Those penetrating holes were inaccessible to me 
because they are under the belly paper in the floor of the home and 
they are unaccessible to me once the home is completed, except 
penetrations in the paper, I would repair penetrations in the paper. 
Q: So after the home is received and placed up on the jacks, if you were 
to crawl underneath and you are looking at the belly paper could you 
see where the holes were? 
A: No. 
(R. 398-402, 468-469). Additionally, Mr. Schram testified that penetrations in the 
external walls of the home did not run through to the interior walls of the home. (R. 401-
402). 
3. When homes manufactured by the Oakwood Appellee were delivered to the 
Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, there were quite often rips and tears in the "belly 
paper" that was intended to cover and seal the underside of the homes. (R. at 382, 404-
409). These rips were so common that the manufacturer regularly provided rolls of 
replacement belly paper. (R. at 382, 406-407). 
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RESPONSE: This statement is not supported by evidence in the record. Again, 
the Dimicks rely on testimony from John Schram. Mr. Schram did not testify to any rips 
and tears in the "belly paper" of the Dimick home in particular or any Oakwood home in 
general, and Mr. Schram did not testify that Oakwood regularly provided rolls of belly 
paper to Happy Homes. Instead, Mr. Schram testified as to his experience with setting up 
"approximately 400 homes" from various manufacturers. (R. 406-407, 464, 469). Mr. 
Schram testified that he did not recall any rips or tears in the belly paper of the home sold 
to Christopher Dimick. (R. 468-469). There is no evidence of a rip or tear in the belly 
paper of the home sold to Christopher Dimick. 
4. John Schram, an employee of the sales lot in Helper, testified in deposition 
that the 30-50 penetrations in the underside and exterior walls of the manufactured home 
were for piping and venting and that the holes were sometimes caulked: 
Q: [By Mr. Booke, Appellants' counsel] A little while ago you were 
talking about the penetrations that were sometimes put in the 
modular homes for plumbing and other reasons? 
A: [By Mr. Schram] Uh-huh. 
Q: Did you caulk those holes as part of patching up the holes or did you 
put caulk in the holes that were already there for plumbing or other 
reasons, electrical? 
A: The factory puts their plumbing and electrical through the holes and 
I'm not sure I they caulk or put like foam, the expanding foam. I 
think they do in some instances put the expanding foam around the 
pipes where they penetrate. 
(R. at 451, 468-469). 
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RESPONSE: The statement is misleading. Mr. Schram testified that he did not 
know the number of penetrations in the sub-flooring of the Dimick home. (R. 399). Mr. 
Schram estimated that there may be 30 to 50 penetrations in that type of home, but the 
penetrations were not accessible to him. (R. 468-469). 
5. John Schram also testified that interior insulation could be seen through the 
penetrations in the exterior walls. (R. at 399-401, 464-465). 
RESPONSE: The statement is incomplete and misleading. Mr. Schram also 
testified that exterior wall penetrations did not run through to interior walls. (R. 464-
466). Moreover, Mr. Schram did not testify that he saw interior insulation through any 
penetration in an exterior wall of the home sold to Christopher Dimick. (R. 464-466). 
Importantly, no witness, including the Dimicks, testified that they observed unsealed or 
uncaulked penetrations in the Dimick home. 
6. Oakwood knew that manufactured homes shipped to Happy Homes were 
displayed in a lot that was in an open field. There was no means of preventing access by 
deer mice in the field where the homes were displayed. (R. at 382, 384, 411-413). 
RESPONSE: This statement is false and not supported by evidence in the record. 
The citations offered to support this alleged fact offer no such support. While the 
evidence in the record indicates that Oakwood knew that the home purchased by Happy 
Homes was to be delivered to Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, Utah, there is no 
evidence that Oakwood had any knowledge of the conditions of the Happy Homes lot. 
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(R. 326-328). Furthermore, Mary Musgrave did not testify that there was "no means of 
preventing" deer mice from accessing the Happy Homes lot; rather, she testified that 
Happy Homes did not implement measures to prevent deer mice from accessing the lot. 
(R. 413-415). 
7. It has long been well known in the Price/Helper area that deer mice are 
carriers of Hantavirus. (R. 382, 384, 417-419, 421-425). 
RESPONSE: This statement is overbroad and not supported by evidence in the 
record. Mr. Hoggatt and Ms. Musgrave merely testified as to their individual knowledge 
of the hantavirus and offered no testimony as to whether the cause of hantavirus "has long 
been well known in the Price/Helper area." (R. 417-419, 421-425). 
8. On March 11, 2000, Reid Dimick, Cathy Dimick and Chris Dimick went 
into a home, manufactured by Oakwood, that was sitting on the Happy Homes sales lot in 
Helper, Utah. While looking in a bedroom closet, they saw deer mice nestings and 
droppings. (R. at 382, 385, 427-434, 436). 
RESPONSE: This allegation was disputed in the trial court, however it was not 
material to the trial court's ruling on Oakwood's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
9. On May 27, 2000, Cathy Dimick became violently ill with Hantavirus. She 
died within three days of the onset of her final illness. Three days after Cathy's death, 
Chris became violently ill with Hantavirus. He is now permanently disabled as a result of 
the Hantavirus. (R. at 382-383, 385, 438-444). 
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RESPONSE: This allegation was not material to the trial court's ruling on 
Oakwood's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
10. Reid Dimick knows of no Hantavirus exposure that Cathy and Chris could 
both have suffered, except for their simultaneous exposure in Oakwood's manufactured 
home on the Happy Homes sales lot on March 11, 2000. (R. at 383, 385, 446-448). 
RESPONSE: This allegation was disputed in the trial court, however it was not 
material to the trial court's ruling on Oakwood's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
11. Oakwood argued to the trial court "They (the homes) have penetrations in 
them. Those penetrations are signed off by HUD. They're part of a checklist the 
government has said cNot a problem,' which creates the presumption that this home was 
free of defects." (Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 16:11-14, February 28, 2005). 
RESPONSE: Oakwood's argument is supported by evidence in the record and the 
Dimicks offered no evidence to refute it. Specifically, the "HUD Compliance Assurance 
Inspection Form" for the Dimick home contains a line-item that reads: "Bottom Board 
Sealed & Repaired to Prevent Rodent Access". Both halves of the Dimick home 
complied with this requirement. (R. 333, 337). The Dimicks offered no evidence that the 
Dimick home failed to comply with any government standard. 
12. The checklist on which Oakwood relied is silent as to penetrations in the 
home. (R. at 331-338). 
RESPONSE: This statement is false. The "HUD Compliance Assurance 
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Inspection Form" applicable to the Dimick home contains a line-item that reads: "Bottom 
Board Sealed & Repaired to Prevent Rodent Access". Both halves of the Dimick home 
complied with this requirement. (R. 333, 337). 
13. The trial court admitted the checklist as evidence, without affidavits 
demonstrating any evidentiary foundation for or describing the use of, the document. 
(Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 5:18-24, February 28, 2005). 
RESPONSE: Oakwood's Motion for Summary Judgment cited the "HUD 
Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" for the Dimick home and it was attached as an 
exhibit to Oakwood's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (R. 299, 330-337). The Dimicks did not raise in their opposing 
memorandum any objection to the HUD inspection form. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Oakwood on all of the Dimicks' claims because the Dimicks failed to produce 
evidence of a defect in the Oakwood home purchased by Christopher Dimick. Instead, 
they offered only a bare contention of a defect. Additionally, the Dimicks did not offer 
any evidence indicating that the home was unreasonably dangerous nor that their alleged 
injuries were proximately caused by a defect in the home. Because the Dimicks failed to 
meet their burden, the trial court's judgment in favor of Oakwood should be affirmed. 
Second, the Dimicks did not object to the trial court's consideration of the "HUD 
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Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" nor did they argue to the trial court that the 
home failed to comply with government standards. Accordingly, they failed to preserve 
these arguments for appellate review. Substantively, although the Dimicks argue that 24 
C.F.R. § 3280.603(b)(6) requires that "[a]ll exterior openings around piping and 
equipment shall be sealed to resist the entry of rodents[,]" the Dimicks produced 
absolutely no evidence indicating that exterior openings on the Dimick home were not 
sealed. This Court should decline to consider these issues because they were raised for 
the first time on appeal. 
Third, Oakwood did not raise new arguments in its Reply Brief in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Oakwood's motion requested judgment in its favor on 
all of the Dimicks' claims. The Dimicks had a fair and full opportunity to oppose the 
motion both by opposing memoranda and oral argument to the trial court. Being fully 
advised, the trial court correctly concluded that there was no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and that Oakwood was entitled to judgment in its favor on all of the 
Dimicks' claims. 
Finally, the trial court properly certified the judgment in favor of Oakwood as final 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Dimicks' lawsuit involved multiple claims against 
multiple parties. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Oakwood 
disposed of all claims asserted by the Dimicks against Oakwood; however, the Dimicks' 
claims against the other parties remained. Therefore, after concluding there was no just 
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reason for delay, the trial court properly certified its judgment in favor of Oakwood as 
final pursuant to Rule 54(b). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DIMICKS FAILED TO OFFER EVIDENCE OF A SPECIFIC 
DEFECT THAT RENDERED THE HOME "UNREASONABLY 
DANGEROUS" AND FAILED TO OFFER EVIDENCE THAT A 
DEFECT PROXIMATELY CAUSED THEIR ALLEGED INJURIES, 
THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
OAKWOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court correctly granted Oakwood's motion for summary judgment 
because there existed no genuine issue as to any material fact and Oakwood was entitled 
to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.3 In the court proceedings below, the Dimicks 
offered no evidence of a specific defect in the mobile home that proximately caused their 
alleged injuries. The Dimicks simply alleged, without offering any evidentiary support, 
that the home was defective due to the supposed existence of 30 to 50 penetrations in the 
home. These penetrations in the sub-flooring and exterior are part of the design of the 
home allowing for utility connections and venting. There is no evidence in the record that 
these penetrations constituted a "defect" under Utah law. Because the Dimicks failed to 
3As a threshold matter, the Dimicks ignored Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B) and failed 
to specifically rebut the statement of undisputed material facts set forth in Oakwood 
Homes' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 381-383). Instead the Dimicks simply offered their own statement of 
allegedly disputed material facts. As a result of their failure to follow procedural 
requirements, they should not now be allowed to allege the existence of disputed material 
facts. A copy of Utah R. Civ. P. 7 is attached as addendum #5 to the Brief of Appellant. 
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offer evidence of a defect in the home sufficient to meet their burden under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-15-6(1) and Utah case law, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment 
in favor of Oakwood. 
The "argument" section of the Dimicks' Memorandum in Opposition to Oakwood 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is just over two pages long, and in those few 
pages, the Dimicks contend that Oakwood homes in general are defective because they 
allegedly have "30 to 50 pre-drilled holes into specific locations in the bottoms and sides 
of the homes." (R. 383-385). The Dimicks cited no authority to support their contention 
that these penetrations actually constituted a defect. (R. 383-385). Furthermore, the 
Dimicks did not dispute that the home complied with all applicable government standards 
as demonstrated by the home's "HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" attached 
as Exhibit 4 to Oakwood's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 383-385, 329-337). Because the Dimicks offered 
only a bare contention of a defect, the Dimicks could not sustain their claims against 
Oakwood and the trial court properly granted Oakwood's motion for summary judgment. 
Under Utah law, in order to prevail under a products liability, breach of express or 
implied warranty, or negligence theory against Oakwood, the Dimicks were required to 
produce evidence of a manufacturing defect in the Oakwood home that rendered it 
unreasonably dangerous. Utah Code Ann. 78-15-6 reads: 
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage 
allegedly caused by a defect in a product: 
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(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a 
defective condition, unless at the time the product was sold by 
the manufacturer or other initial seller, there was a defect or 
defective condition in the product which made the product 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. 
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the 
product was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or 
user of that product in that community considering the 
product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses 
together with any actual knowledge, training, or experience 
possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer. 
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from 
any defect or defective condition where the alleged defect in 
the plans or designs for the product or the methods and 
techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the 
product were in conformity with government standards 
established for that industry which were in existence at the 
time the plans or designs for the product or the methods and 
techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the 
product were adopted. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-15-6.4 With respect to Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1), the Dimicks 
offered no evidence that at the time the home was sold by the manufacturer, Oakwood, to 
Happy Homes, the home was unreasonably dangerous due to a manufacturing defect. 
Instead, the Dimicks merely contended that Oakwood homes generally contain 30 to 50 
pre-drilled holes for hooking up plumbing and electrical connections, and that these holes 
acted as portals through which living creatures, including deer mice carrying hantavirus, 
could enter Oakwood's manufactured homes. (R. 383). However, there is no evidence in 
4
 A copy of this statute is attached to the Brief of the Appellant as Addendum #2. 
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the record to support this contention. While the Dimicks cited the deposition testimony of 
John Schram for the proposition that the pre-drilled holes in Oakwood homes were 
accessible to rodents, Mr. Schram's testimony does not offer such support. (R. 383-384). 
Mr. Schram was employed by defendants Happy Homes and Lifestyle Homes to 
set up manufactured homes on the sales lot upon receipt from the manufacturer. (R. 300, 
350-351). When the home that was ultimately sold to the Dimicks was received by 
Happy Homes, Mr. Schram assembled the home on the Happy Homes lot. (R. 300, 350-
351). Mr. Schram specifically testified that mobile home manufacturers generally caulk 
or put expanding foam around the pipes and holes. (R. 468-469).5 He also testified that 
the holes were not accessible to him once the home was assembled, and that pre-drilled 
holes on the exterior of a home did not run through to the interior walls of a home. (R. 
465-466, 469). Most importantly, Mr. Schram did not testify to any defects in the 
Oakwood home that was sold to the Dimicks. (R. 350-351). 
In short, the Dimicks have offered no evidence of any defect in the Oakwood 
home that existed at the time of sale. Although they contend that pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 
3280.603(6) "All exterior openings around piping and equipment shall be sealed to resist 
the entrance of rodents," they offer absolutely no evidence that the Oakwood home failed 
5There is no evidence in the record to support an inference that utility penetrations 
in the Dimick home were unsealed or uncaulked. Mr. Schram did not testify that the 
Dimick home had unsealed or uncovered penetrations nor did the Dimicks offer such 
testimony. If they had, the Dimicks certainly would have cited such testimony in their 
opposition to Oakwood's motion for summary judgment. 
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to comply with this regulation.6 Mr. Schram's testimony certainly does not offer evidence 
of non-compliance. To be sure, Mr. Schram testified that he observed no defects or 
problems with the Dimick home. (R. 349-350). Instead, all evidence in the record 
indicates that the home complied with all government standards. Specifically, the last 
page of the "HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" contains an entry requiring 
that the home's "Bottom Board Sealed & Repaired to Prevent Rodent Access". (R. 383-
385). Both halves of the home complied with this requirement and therefore complied 
with 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603(6). The Dimicks did not and have not offered any contrary 
evidence. 
With respect to Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(2), the Dimicks further failed to 
establish that the alleged defect rendered the home "unreasonably dangerous" or 
"dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by the ordinary and 
prudent buyer, consumer, or user of that product in the community considering the 
product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers, and uses . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-15-6(2). Homes are living breathing structures with windows, doors, and various 
other openings that allow for utility connections and venting. By their very nature, homes 
are not hermetic. The Dimicks allegation that the alleged 30 to 50 penetrations in the 
homes somehow constituted an "unreasonably dangerous" manufacturing defect ignores 
6A copy of 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603 is attached to the Brief of the Appellant as 
Addendum #1. 
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the very nature and characteristics of any home. The home was certainly not 
"unreasonably dangerous" within the definition of Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(2) due to 
penetrations that allowed for utility connections and venting. 
Moreover, because Oakwood established that the home complied with government 
standards for manufactured homes, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-15-6(3) there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the home was free of defects. The Dimicks failed to offer any 
evidence to rebut the statutory presumption, and the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of Oakwood. 
Utah case law further supports the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Oakwood. In Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1994), the Utah Court of Appeals applied Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 to specific facts. 
The court explained that "in order to prevail on a claim for strict products liability, the 
plaintiff must meet a three-part test. The plaintiff must show (1) that the product was 
unreasonably dangerous due to a defect or defective condition, (2) that the defect existed 
at the time the product was sold, and (3) that the defective condition was a cause of the 
plaintiffs injuries." Because the Dimicks produced no evidence of a defect or defective 
condition in the home, they could not satisfy the first prong of the test. Furthermore, 
because the Dimicks offered no evidence of a defect or defective condition, they failed to 
satisfy the second and third prongs of the test. 
The plaintiff in Burns. Burns, injured himself while riding his bicycle. He filed 
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suit against the bicycle's manufacturer as well as the shop that sold him the bicycle 
alleging breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, breach of certain express 
warranties, products liability, and negligence. Id. at 417. Burns attempted to show that 
the bicycle's braking system was defective and that the defective condition proximately 
caused his injuries. Burns, however, was unable to produce any evidence establishing 
that his bicycle in general or the braking system in particular were in any way defective. 
While Burns alleged that his accident was caused when "the brake spring for the front 
brakes of the bicycle popped off, causing the brakes to clamp down on the front of the 
bicycle," Bums consulted with an expert that advised him that loss of the spring would 
actually have an opposite effect and cause the brakes to release. Id. This conclusion was 
shared by the defendants' experts. IcL 
Because Bums lacked evidence of a defect in the bicycle, the defendants' filed a 
motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and Bums appealed. 
The Utah Court of Appeals agreed that Burns failed to produce any evidence of a defect 
in the bicycle or evidence that his injuries were caused by a defect of the bicycle and 
affirmed the trial court. Id. at 418. Specifically, the court stated: 
In sum, in order to defeat defendants' motion for summary judgment, Bums 
must provide some evidence that a defect existed at the time he bought the 
bicycle and that the defect caused his injury. It is not enough to merely 
contend that a defect existed, show that an accident occurred, and assume 
the two are necessarily related. 
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Id. (emphasis in original).7 
The Dimicks similarly failed to meet their burden. Specifically, they failed to 
provide any evidence that a defect existed in the home and that the defect proximately 
caused their alleged injuries. Instead, the Dimicks simply contended that a defect existed, 
claimed that they were injured, and assumed the two were necessarily related. Under 
Utah law, this was not sufficient to defeat Oakwood's motion for summary judgment and 
the trial court properly granted judgment in favor of Oakwood. 
II. THE DIMICKS5 OBJECTIONS TO THE HUD CHECKLIST AND 
THEIR CONTENTION THAT THE HOME DID NOT COMPLY 
WITH HUD STANDARDS WERE NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT AND WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. 
In their appellate brief, the Dimicks for the first time argue that the 
Oakwood home did not comply with standards promulgated by the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). Additionally, in their 
appellate brief, the Dimicks for the first time raise objections to the "HUD Compliance 
Assurance Inspection Form" that was attached as Exhibit 4 to Oakwood's Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. The Dimicks 
7
 Furthermore, under Burns, even assuming arguendo that the penetrations in the 
home could be considered a "defect," the Dimicks still could not prevail on their claims 
against Oakwood. There is no evidence in the record that a hantavirus infected rodent 
entered the home through such a penetration as opposed to a door, window, or other such 
entryway into the home. Because the element of proximate cause would be based solely 
on speculation, the Dimicks' claims against Oakwood would fail as a matter of law. 
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Ut Ct. App. 1994). 
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did not raise these arguments in their Memorandum in Opposition to Oakwood's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, they did not assert them in the oral arguments on the motion for 
summary judgment, and therefore they did not preserve the arguments for appellate 
review. To be sure, the Dimicks' appellate brief does not cite to any portion of the record 
to evidence that the arguments were preserved. By failing to raise the arguments below, 
the Dimicks denied Oakwood the opportunity to address them, and denied the trial court 
an opportunity to rule upon them. For this reason alone, the Dimicks' arguments should 
be rejected by this Court and the trial court's summary judgment affirmed. See Cannon v. 
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc., 2005 UT App 352 fn 4; 121 P.3d 74 ("we do not 
consider arguments for the first time on appeal that have not been properly preserved or 
raised below"); Coombs v. Juice Works Development, Inc., 2003 UT App 388 fn 3; 81 
P.3d 769 ("We will not address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal."). 
The Dimicks' new arguments may also be dismissed on substantive grounds. The 
"HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" was produced in the regular course of 
discovery as one of the many business records Oakwood possessed with respect to the 
design, manufacture, and sale of the home. The form is admissible evidence under Utah 
R. Evid. 803(6) as a record kept in the ordinary course of Oakwood's regularly conducted 
business activity.8 
Next, the Dimicks mistakenly contend that the "HUD Compliance Assurance 
8Utah R. Evid. 803 is attached hereto as Addendum #2. 
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Inspection Form" is inherently untrustworthy because it is silent on the issue of "rodent 
resistance" and therefore contravenes 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603(b)(6). In fact the form does 
address the issue with a line item that reads: "Bottom Board Sealed & Repaired to 
Prevent Rodent Access." (R. 383-385). Upon inspection, the home was certified as 
compliant with this requirement. (R. 329-337). 
The Dimicks had ample opportunity to object to the HUD form in the trial court 
proceedings. Indeed, they could have opposed Oakwood's motion for summary judgment 
by filing a Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion for additional discovery in order to conduct 
discovery with respect to the home's compliance with government standards.9 
Alternatively, they could have requested the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing on the 
HUD form. Instead, the Dimicks elected not to challenge the form and elected not to 
dispute the home's compliance with government standards. Having failed to raise and 
preserve these arguments in the trial court, the Dimicks should not be allowed to assert 
them for the first time on appeal. 
III. OAKWOOD DID NOT RAISE NEW ISSUES IN ITS REPLY BRIEF 
AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF OAKWOOD ON ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' 
CLAIMS. 
Oakwood's motion for summary judgment was comprehensive: the motion 
requested judgment in Oakwood's favor on all claims asserted by plaintiffs against 
9A copy of Utah R. Civ. P. 56 is attached to the Brief of Appellant at Addendum 
#3. 
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Oakwood. (R. 291, 295). In accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), the trial court 
correctly granted Oakwood's motion because there were no genuine issues as to any 
material fact and Oakwood was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.10 The 
Dimicks5 initial complaint, First Amended Complaint, and Second Amended Complaint 
named several defendants, including Oakwood. These complaints failed to set forth 
specific causes action. (R. 001, 015, 171). Furthermore, the allegations of the complaints 
were seemingly directed toward all defendants rather than specific parties.11 
Nevertheless, after considerable discovery took place, including written discovery 
requests and depositions of key witnesses, the Dimicks had produced no evidence of a 
defect in the home purchased from co-defendant Happy Homes nor evidence that 
Oakwood breached any duty allegedly owed the Dimicks. Accordingly, Oakwood filed a 
motion for summary judgment on all of the Dimicks' claims. (R. 291). 
Oakwood's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment stated: "Plaintiffs have not and cannot meet their burden of proof in 
10A copy of Utah R. Civ. P. 56 is attached to the Brief of Appellant at Addendum 
#3. 
11
 On May 4, 2004, the Dimicks filed with the trial court an Application for Leave to 
File a Third Amended Complaint together with a copy of a Third Amended Complaint. 
(R. 222). Unlike the Dimicks' preceding complaints, this Third Amended Complaint 
listed specific causes of action and the allegations identified specific parties rather than 
generic "defendants." However, the Dimicks' Third Amended Complaint was not served 
to Oakwood's counsel or counsel for any other defendant. (R. 225, 248). To be sure, the 
Certificates of Service on the Dimicks' Application for Leave to File a Third Amended 
Complaint and the Third Amended Complaint itself were not executed. (R.225, 248). 
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order to state a viable claim against Oakwood. In order to prevail under a products 
liability, breach of express or implied warranty, or negligence theory against Oakwood, 
plaintiffs must provide some evidence of a manufacturing defect in the home." (R. 302). 
Oakwood argued that because plaintiffs had produced no evidence of a defect in the 
Oakwood home, and no evidence that their claimed injuries were proximately caused by 
any defect in the home, all of their claims failed as a matter of law. 
Despite the fact that Oakwood's motion for summary judgment addressed all 
claims purportedly asserted by the Dimicks against Oakwood, the Dimicks nevertheless 
stated in their opposing memorandum that Oakwood's motion for summary judgment 
should be treated by the trial court as a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue 
of strict products liability alone.12 The Dimicks then only opposed Oakwood's request for 
12Specifically, the Dimicks stated: 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Oakwood defendants' motion should 
properly be styled as a motion for partial summary judgment, because it 
seeks judgment only on Plaintiffs' strict products liability theory. Thus, the 
Oakwood defendants do not seek judgment on the additional causes of 
action alleged in the Third Amended Complaint — Breach of Implied 
Warranty (Fitness), Breach of Warranty (Merchantability), Breach of 
Express Warranty, Negligent Failure to Warn, and Premises Liability. This 
opposition, then, will address only the strict products liability theory. If the 
Oakwood defendants assert otherwise, Plaintiffs' respectfully request leave 
to supplement this opposition. 
(R. 380) (emphasis in original). It should be noted that the Dimicks here relied upon their 
Third Amended Complaint which unlike their prior complaints actually stated specific 
causes of action. However, the Dimicks never served Oakwood with a copy of the Third 
Amended Complaint and therefore the claims as set forth in the Second Amended 
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judgment on the strict products liability claim. 
In its Reply Memorandum in Support of Oakwood's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Oakwood again asserted that there were no genuine issues as to any material 
fact, and that Oakwood was entitled to judgment in its favor, as a matter of law, on all 
claims asserted by the Dimicks. Again, Oakwood argued that because the Dimicks had 
produced no evidence of any defect in the home and no evidence that Oakwood breached 
any duty allegedly owed the Dimicks, all of the Dimicks' claims against Oakwood failed 
as a matter of law. (R. 455-459). That Oakwood sought summary judgment on all of the 
Dimicks' claims was abundantly clear to all parties. 
Thereafter, even though the Dimicks were clearly aware that Oakwood sought 
judgment on all of their claims and despite their having earlier requested leave of court to 
supplement their opposition to Oakwood's motion, the Dimicks did not file a 
supplemental brief in opposition to Oakwood's motion. On December 2, 2004, Oakwood 
filed a "Notice to Submit for Decision" with the trial court. (R. 493). The Dimicks did 
not file any objection to this notice. On February 2, 2005, the trial court scheduled oral 
arguments on Oakwood's Motion for Summary Judgment for February 28, 2005. (R. 
593). The Dimicks did not object to the scheduling of oral arguments and did not seek to 
have them rescheduled in order to allow time for supplemental briefing. Instead, the 
Complaint were at issue, not those asserted in the Third Amended Complaint. (R. 225, 
248). 
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Dimicks let the matter proceed forward and the trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Oakwood on all of the Dimicks claims. In light of these facts, the Dimicks were 
not unfairly prejudiced and were not precluded from marshaling evidence or making 
argument on any warranty, failure to warn, or other theory. 
The Dimicks' reliance on Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 16 P.3d 540, for the 
proposition that issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived and may not be 
considered is entirely misplaced. The Brown case has no bearing in this matter for two 
reasons: first, as set forth above, Oakwood did not raise new issues in its Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, and second, the Utah Supreme Court's 
statement that they will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief 
explicitly applies to appellate briefs filed with the Utah Supreme Court rather than 
memoranda filed at the trial court level. Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court cited Utah 
R. App. P. 24 and stated "Generally, issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that 
were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered 
by the appellate court." Id. at [^23 (emphasis added).13 The Utah Supreme Court's 
statement therefore applies to specifically to appellate briefs and not trial briefs. 
The record is clear: Oakwood did not raise new issues in its reply brief, the 
13Utah R. Civ. P. 24 specifically limits the issues that may be addressed in an 
appellant's reply brief: "Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matters set 
forth in the opposing brief." Utah R. Civ. P. 24(c). A copy of Rule 24 is attached hereto 
as Addendum #3. 
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Dimicks had ample opportunity to oppose Oakwood's motion for summary judgment, and 
the Dimicks were not unfairly prejudiced. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Oakwood on all of the Dimicks' claims. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CERTIFIED THE JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF OAKWOOD AS FINAL PURSUANT TO UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 54(b) BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT COMPLETELY 
DISPOSED OF OAKWOOD AS A PARTY. 
The trial court's judgment in favor of Oakwood on all of the Dimicks claims 
completely disposed of Oakwood as a party; however, the Dimicks' claims against the 
remaining defendants remained intact. Accordingly, the trial court certified the judgment 
in favor of Oakwood as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) permits a trial 
court to "direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 
claims or parties" in a matter involving either multiple claims or multiple parties. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 54(b).14 The effect of directing a final judgment for a partial disposition of a case 
is to make the specified final judgment immediately appealable, although the remainder 
of the case goes forward in the trial court. See Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 814P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1991). 
The Dimicks contention that the trial court erred in certifying as final the judgment 
in favor of Oakwood due to the existence of overlapping claims ignores the text of Utah 
R. Civ. P. 54(b) and Utah case law. Rule 54(b) specifically allows the trial court to 
14A copy of Utah R. Civ. P. 54 is attached to the Brief of Appellant as Addendum 
#6. 
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certify as a final a judgment that completely disposes of a party, regardless of whether 
multiple claims remain pending before the trial court. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). To be sure, 
the rule states: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action . . . and/or 
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final 
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties, only 
upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. 
Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765,767 
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court set forth three requirements that must be met for 
proper Rule 54(b) certification: 
First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the 
action. Second, the judgment appealed from must have been entered on an 
order that would be appealable but for the fact that other claims ur parties 
remain in the action. Third, the trial court, in its discretion, must make a 
determination that "there is no just reason for delay" of the appeal. 
These requirements are clearly satisfied here. First, the Dimicks asserted multiple claims 
for relief against multiple parties. Second, the judgment in favor of Oakwood would have 
been immediately appealable but for the fact that other parties remained in the action. 
Third, the trial court determined that there was no just reason for delay of the appeal. (R. 
621, 644). The trial court's decision therefore complied with both Rule 54(b) and Pate. 
The Dimicks' reliance on Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 
1099 (Utah 1991) is misplaced because it is clearly distinguishable from this case. The 
issue in Kennecott was the standard for determining whether a particular lawsuit involved 
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"separate claims" under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). In Kennecott a group of taxpayers sued 
the State Tax Commission challenging a statute which imposed a levy to provide funds to 
cover expenses incurred by counties in assessing property taxes. Id at p. 1100. The 
taxpayers claimed the levy was invalid under three separate constitutional provisions. Id. 
The taxpayers filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking judgment on one of 
their constitutional claims. Id. The defendant tax collectors filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment for judgment asking the trial court to hold the levy constitutional on 
all three constitutional grounds. Id The trial court denied the taxpayers motion and 
partially granted the tax collectors' motion. Id Specifically, the court held that the 
taxpayers lacked standing to assert one of their constitutional challenges to the levy. Id. 
The court then certified the order as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), and the 
taxpayers appealed that order. Id 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court raised the issue as to whether the trial court 
properly certified the order as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Specifically, the 
Utah Supreme Court examined in detail "the finality requirements of separate claims 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)." Id at p. 1102. The Utah Supreme Court then 
adopted a standard for determining the finality of a separate claim under Rule 54(b). Id 
at p. 1105. 
The "multiple claims" standard adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Kennecott 
does not apply here because the trial court's Rule 54(b) certification in this case was 
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premised upon the disposal of a party rather than a separate claim. As set forth above, 
Rule 54(b) permits a trial court to "direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more 
but fewer than all of the claims or parties" in a matter involving either multiple claims or 
multiple parties. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added). So long as the order below 
disposed of a party, the order was eligible for Rule 54(b) certification. Pate v. Marathon 
Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1984). 
Simply put, the trial court's certification complied with the requirements of Rule 
54(b) and the decision should therefore be affirmed by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that Oakwood was entitled, as a matter of law, to judgment in its favor 
on all of the Dimicks' claims. After two years of extensive discovery, the Dimicks failed 
to produce any evidence of a defect in the Oakwood home that Christopher Dimick 
purchased from Happy Homes. Accordingly, under Utah law, the Dimicks could not 
sustain their claims against Oakwood. The trial court allowed the Dimicks a fair and full 
opportunity to oppose Oakwood's motion for summary judgment, and their opposition 
failed for lack of evidence of a defect in the home. The Dimicks' procedural and 
evidentiary objections to the trial court's ruling are not supported by the record below and 
do not alter the fact that the Dimicks failed to offer anything more than a bare allegations 
against Oakwood. The trial court properly dismissed the Dimicks' claims against 
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Oakwood as a matter of law. Because the judgment in favor of Oakwood disposed of 
Oakwood as a party, after finding that there was no just cause for delay, the trial court 
correctly certified the judgment as final. The trial court's judgment should therefore be 
affirmed by this Court. 
DATED this Z? day of April, 2006. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
TERRY M. PLANT • 
H. JUSTIN HITT 
Attorneys for Appellee OHC Liquidation Trust 
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Defendants. 
On February 28, 2005 the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by OHC Liquidation Trust 
as successor in interest to defendants Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., Oakwood Shared 
Services, LLC, Schult Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP (collectively 
"Oakwood") came before the Court for oral argument. The Court, having heard oral arguments, 
having reviewed the motions and authorities cited therein, and being fully advised, enters the 
following Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and resulting Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and specifically 
finds as follows: 
1. On May 18,1998, Happy Homes ordered a manufactured home from Oakwood. 
2. Pursuant to Happy Homes' order, Oakwood manufactured a home (model 
number 5828) bearing serial numbers 284627A and B (the "Home") for sale and delivery to 
Happy Homes. 
3. On June 24, 1998, the Home was inspected by an inspector for the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Home met government standards as was 
certified by the inspector as such by the affixation of Department of Housing and Urban 
Development numbers 415130 and 415131 thereto. 
4. Happy Homes tendered payment for the Home and the Home was delivered to 
Happy Homes' sales lot in June 1998. 
5. Prior to accepting delivery and possession of the Home, Happy Homes' agents 
and employees inspected the Homp. 
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6. Happy Homes' agents and employees did not observe any problems with, defects 
in, or defective conditions in the Home when Happy Homes received, inspected, and took 
possession of the Home. The Home was ready for retail sale when received by Happy Homes. 
7. Happy Homes never notified Oakwood of any problems with, defects in, or 
defective conditions of the Home. 
8. On March 11, 2000, Christopher Dimick toured the Home with his parents, Reid 
and Cathy Dimick, and that same day contracted to buy the Home from Happy Homes. 
9. The Home sat on Happy Homes rural sales lot in Helper, Utah from June 1998 
until the Home was delivered to Christopher Dimick's property on May 22, 2000. 
10. Happy Homes hired John Schram to assemble the Home on the Happy Homes 
lot when it was received from Oakwood in 1998 and to disassemble the Home for transport to 
the Dimick property in 2000. Mr. Schram did not observe any defects in or problems with the 
Home on either occasion. 
11. Mary Musgrave worked as a sales agent for Happy Homes in Helper, Utah. Ms. 
Musgrave showed the Home to prospective purchasers "countless" times between June 1998 
and May 2000. Ms. Musgrave never observed any manufacturing defects in the Home and never 
saw any evidence of mice in the Home. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court finds that there is no justification for holding the Oakwood defendants liable for 
plaintiffs' alleged injuries and damages, and specifically concludes as follows: 
Plaintiffs failed to rebut the Utah Code Ann. § 78-'«5-6W presumption hat xho 
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Home was free from any defect or defective condition because the Home complied with 
government standards relating to design, manufacture, and inspection of manufactured homes. 
2. Plaintiffs offered no evidence that the Home was unreasonably dangerous 
due to a defect or defective condition, no evidence that a defect existed at the time the Home 
was sold, and no evidence that a defective condition was the proximate cause of their alleged 
injuries. Therefore plaintiffs' claims against Oakwood for strict products liability and breach of 
warranty (merchantability) fail as a matter of law. 
3. There is no evidence of a defect or defective condition in the Home, a necessary 
element of plaintiffs' claim against Oakwood for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose, and therefore the claim fails as a matter of law. 
4. There is no evidence of any defect or defective condition in the home, and no 
evidence that Oakwood breached any express warranty, and therefore the claim fails as a 
matter of law. 
5. There is no evidence of a defect or defective condition in the Home, a necessary 
element of plaintiffs' claim against Oakwood for negligent failure to warn, and therefore the claim 
fails as a matter of law. 
6. There is no evidence that Oakwood had any ownership or possessory interest in 
the Home after it had been sold and delivered to Happy Homes, and therefore Oakwood did not 
owe any duty to plaintiffs as a premises owner. Additionally, there is no evidence of a defect, 
defective condition, or unsafe condition in the Home that proximately caused plaintiffs' alleged 
injuries. I- c^u < fh^so ar^ necessary elerc. >f plaintiffs' premises liability claim against 
Oakwood, the claim fails as a matter of law. 
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ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
^ased upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by OHC 
Liquidation Trust as successor in interest to Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., Oakwood Shared 
Services, LLC, Schult Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP is granted. Judgment 
is entered in favor of defendants Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., Oakwood Shared Services, LLC, 
Schult Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP and against plaintiffs on all claims 
asserted by plaintiffs against these defendants in plaintiffs* Third Amended Complaint. All claims 
against defendants Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., Oakwood Shared Services, LLC, Schult 
Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP are dismissed on the merits with prejudice. 
In accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), the Court finds there is no just reason for delay 
and directs entry of final judgmefrpn favor of the Oakwood defendants. 
DATED t h i s ^ j j l f day of <Z^2^<2 U^h^JJ/^j^^^b. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Ah^rhL^. 
BRADLEY LJ BOOKE 
Attorney forPlaintiffs 
€^-
JUDGE BRUCE K. HALLIDAY 
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Tab 2 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as 
a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition 
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's 
then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, 
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes 
of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, 
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof 
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a 
witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify 
fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was 
fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the 
memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit 
unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the 
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to 
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rules 
902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this 
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every 
kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6). 
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, 
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in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence 
or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information 
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any 
form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) 
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in 
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority 
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, fetal 
deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to 
requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or 
data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a 
record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a 
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or 
testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data 
compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, 
legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or 
family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a 
certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a sacrament, 
made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a 
religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued 
at the time of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained in 
family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, 
engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a document 
purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the content of the original 
recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have 
been executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the 
recording of documents of that kind in that office. 
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(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement contained in a 
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant 
to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property since the document was made 
have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence twenty years or 
more the authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, 
directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by 
persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon 
cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements 
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or 
other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the 
witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read 
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of a 
person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the 
community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, 
relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family 
history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a community 
arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community, 
and reputation as to events of general history important to the community or State or nation in 
which located. 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among associates or in the 
community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or 
upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a 
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to 
sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal 
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the 
accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. Judgments as proof 
of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the 
same would be provable by evidence of reputation. 
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Tab 3 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings 
and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment 
or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the 
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears 
immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, 
rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard 
of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out 
verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation 
alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, 
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant 
to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a 
succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a 
mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
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with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved 
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the 
request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief 
unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of 
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited 
in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in 
all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as 
part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or 
document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the 
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant 
to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new 
matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed 
except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral 
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and 
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency 
proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
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injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original 
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of 
published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of 
each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered 
page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to 
exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility 
of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the 
evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of 
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions 
of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph 
(g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a 
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless 
the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not 
exceed 50 pages in length. The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant and 
shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief which contains an answer 
to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response 
to the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 
25 pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not to exceed 25 
pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's answers to the original issues 
raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive 
of table of contents, table of authorities, and addenda and maybe exceeded only by permission of 
the court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than 
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of 
either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of 
the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to 
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before 
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the 
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the 
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall 
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without argument state the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made 
within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or 
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the 
offending lawyer. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as 
a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition 
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's 
then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, 
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes 
of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, 
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof 
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a 
witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify 
fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was 
fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the 
memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit 
unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the 
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to 
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rules 
902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or 
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circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this 
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every 
kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6). 
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, 
in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence 
or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information 
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any 
form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) 
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in 
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority 
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, fetal 
deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to 
requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or 
data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a 
record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a 
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or 
testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data 
compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, 
legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or 
family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a 
certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a sacrament, 
made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a 
religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued 
at the time of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained in 
family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, 
engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like. 
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(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a document 
purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the content of the original 
recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have 
been executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the 
recording of documents of that kind in that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement contained in a 
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant 
to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property since the document was made 
have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence twenty years or 
more the authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists,, 
directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by 
persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon 
cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements 
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or 
other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the 
witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements maybe read 
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of a 
person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the 
community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, 
relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family 
history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a community 
arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community, 
and reputation as to events of general history important to the community or State or nation in 
which located. 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among associates or in the 
community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or 
upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a 
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to 
sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal 
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the 
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accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. Judgments as proof 
of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the 
same would be provable by evidence of reputation. 
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